Belief about the self
Feit, Neil.
Belief about the self a defense of the property theory of content / [electronic resource] : Neil Feit. - Oxford : Oxford University Press, c2008. - 1 online resource (xvi, 195 p.)
Includes bibliographical references and index.
Philosophers typically suppose that the contents of our beliefs and other cognitive attitudes are propositions - things that might be true or false, and their truth values do not vary from time to time, place to place, or person to person. Neil Feit argues that this view breaks down in the face of beliefs about the self.
9780199866922 (ebook) : No price
Self (Philosophy)
BD450
126
Belief about the self a defense of the property theory of content / [electronic resource] : Neil Feit. - Oxford : Oxford University Press, c2008. - 1 online resource (xvi, 195 p.)
Includes bibliographical references and index.
Philosophers typically suppose that the contents of our beliefs and other cognitive attitudes are propositions - things that might be true or false, and their truth values do not vary from time to time, place to place, or person to person. Neil Feit argues that this view breaks down in the face of beliefs about the self.
9780199866922 (ebook) : No price
Self (Philosophy)
BD450
126