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Electoral Systems and the Balance of Consumer-Producer Power / Eric C. C. Chang, Mark Andreas Kayser, Drew A. Linzer, Ronald Rogowski.

By: Contributor(s): Material type: TextTextSeries: Cambridge Studies in Comparative Politics | Cambridge Studies in Comparative PoliticsPublisher: Cambridge : Cambridge University Press, 2010Description: 1 online resource (280 pages) : digital, PDF file(s)Content type:
  • text
Media type:
  • computer
Carrier type:
  • online resource
ISBN:
  • 9780511761423 (ebook)
Other title:
  • Electoral Systems & the Balance of Consumer-Producer Power
Subject(s): Additional physical formats: Print version: : No titleDDC classification:
  • 339 22
LOC classification:
  • JF1001 .E475 2011
Online resources: Summary: This book investigates the effects of electoral systems on the relative legislative and, hence, regulatory influence of competing interests in society. Building on Ronald Rogowski and Mark Andreas Kayser's extension of the classic Stigler–Peltzman model of regulation, the authors demonstrate that majoritarian electoral arrangements should empower consumers relative to producers. Employing real price levels as a proxy for consumer power, the book rigorously establishes this proposition over time, within the OECD, and across a large sample of developing countries. Majoritarian electoral arrangements depress real prices by approximately ten percent, all else equal. The authors carefully construct and test their argument and broaden it to consider the overall welfare effects of electoral system design and the incentives of actors in the choice of electoral institutions.
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Title from publisher's bibliographic system (viewed on 04 Apr 2016).

This book investigates the effects of electoral systems on the relative legislative and, hence, regulatory influence of competing interests in society. Building on Ronald Rogowski and Mark Andreas Kayser's extension of the classic Stigler–Peltzman model of regulation, the authors demonstrate that majoritarian electoral arrangements should empower consumers relative to producers. Employing real price levels as a proxy for consumer power, the book rigorously establishes this proposition over time, within the OECD, and across a large sample of developing countries. Majoritarian electoral arrangements depress real prices by approximately ten percent, all else equal. The authors carefully construct and test their argument and broaden it to consider the overall welfare effects of electoral system design and the incentives of actors in the choice of electoral institutions.

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