TY  - BOOK
AU  - Çetiner,Demet
ED  - SpringerLink (Online service)
TI  - Fair Revenue Sharing Mechanisms for Strategic Passenger Airline Alliances
T2  - Lecture Notes in Economics and Mathematical Systems,
SN  - 9783642358227
AV  - HD30.23 
U1  - 658.40301 23
PY  - 2013///
CY  - Berlin, Heidelberg
PB  - Springer Berlin Heidelberg, Imprint: Springer
KW  - Business
KW  - Production management
KW  - Operations research
KW  - Decision making
KW  - Management science
KW  - Game theory
KW  - Business and Management
KW  - Operation Research/Decision Theory
KW  - Operations Research, Management Science
KW  - Game Theory
KW  - Operations Management
N1  - Introduction -- Selected Topics in Revenue Management -- A Review of Strategic Passenger Airline Alliances -- Selected Topics in Cooperative Game Theory -- Airline Alliance Revenue Management Game -- Approximate Nucleolus-Based Revenue Shares for Airline Alliances -- Selfish Revenue Sharing Mechanisms for Airline Alliances -- A Revenue Sharing Mechanism Based on the Transfer of Dual Prices -- Conclusion and Future Research -- Appendix: Computational Study
N2  - A major problem arising in airline alliances is to design allocation mechanisms determining how the revenue of a product should be shared among the airlines. The nucleolus is a concept of cooperative game theory that provides solutions for allocating the cost or benefit of a cooperation. This work provides fair revenue proportions for the airline alliances based on the nucleolus, which assumes a centralized decision making system. The proposed mechanism is used as a benchmark to evaluate the fairness of the revenue sharing mechanisms, where the alliance partners behave selfishly. Additionally, a new selfish revenue allocation rule is developed that improves the performance of the existing methods
UR  - http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-35822-7
ER  -