000 02233nam a22003377a 4500
001 sulb-eb0015353
003 BD-SySUS
005 20160405134431.0
008 121129s2013||||enk o ||1 0|eng|d
020 _a9781139628983 (ebook)
020 _z9781107040441 (hardback)
020 _z9781107656093 (paperback)
040 _aUkCbUP
_beng
_erda
_cUkCbUP
050 0 0 _aJL1859.5.C6
_bG56 2013
082 0 0 _a364.1/323098
_223
100 1 _aGingerich, Daniel W.,
_eauthor.
245 1 0 _aPolitical Institutions and Party-Directed Corruption in South America :
_bStealing for the Team /
_cDaniel W. Gingerich.
246 3 _aPolitical Institutions & Party-Directed Corruption in South America
264 1 _aCambridge :
_bCambridge University Press,
_c2013.
300 _a1 online resource (304 pages) :
_bdigital, PDF file(s).
336 _atext
_btxt
_2rdacontent
337 _acomputer
_bc
_2rdamedia
338 _aonline resource
_bcr
_2rdacarrier
490 0 _aPolitical Economy of Institutions and Decisions
500 _aTitle from publisher's bibliographic system (viewed on 04 Apr 2016).
520 _aAn important question for the health and longevity of democratic governance is how institutions may be fashioned to prevent electoral victors from drawing on the resources of the state to perpetuate themselves in power. This book addresses the issue by examining how the structure of electoral institutions - the rules of democratic contestation that determine the manner in which citizens choose their representatives - affects political corruption, defined as the abuse of state power or resources for campaign finance or party-building purposes. To this end, the book develops a novel theoretical framework that examines electoral institutions as a potential vehicle for political parties to exploit the state as a source of political finance. Hypotheses derived from this framework are assessed using an unprecedented public employees' survey conducted by the author in Bolivia, Brazil and Chile.
776 0 8 _iPrint version:
_z9781107040441
830 0 _aPolitical Economy of Institutions and Decisions.
856 4 0 _uhttp://dx.doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781139628983
942 _2Dewey Decimal Classification
_ceBooks
999 _c37197
_d37197