000 | 02036nam a22003137a 4500 | ||
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001 | sulb-eb0015671 | ||
003 | BD-SySUS | ||
005 | 20160405134441.0 | ||
008 | 120301s2013||||enk o ||1 0|eng|d | ||
020 | _a9781139342476 (ebook) | ||
020 | _z9781107029675 (hardback) | ||
020 | _z9781107654976 (paperback) | ||
040 |
_aUkCbUP _beng _erda _cUkCbUP |
||
050 | 0 | 0 |
_aHD9560.5 _b.C576 2013 |
082 | 0 | 0 |
_a355.02/73 _223 |
100 | 1 |
_aColgan, Jeff D., _eauthor. |
|
245 | 1 | 0 |
_aPetro-Aggression : _bWhen Oil Causes War / _cJeff D. Colgan. |
264 | 1 |
_aCambridge : _bCambridge University Press, _c2013. |
|
300 |
_a1 online resource (328 pages) : _bdigital, PDF file(s). |
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336 |
_atext _btxt _2rdacontent |
||
337 |
_acomputer _bc _2rdamedia |
||
338 |
_aonline resource _bcr _2rdacarrier |
||
500 | _aTitle from publisher's bibliographic system (viewed on 04 Apr 2016). | ||
520 | _aOil is the world's single most important commodity and its political effects are pervasive. Jeff Colgan extends the idea of the resource curse into the realm of international relations, exploring how countries form their foreign policy preferences and intentions. Why are some but not all oil-exporting 'petrostates' aggressive? To answer this question, a theory of aggressive foreign policy preferences is developed and then tested, using both quantitative and qualitative methods. Petro-Aggression shows that oil creates incentives that increase a petrostate's aggression, but also incentives for the opposite. The net effect depends critically on its domestic politics, especially the preferences of its leader. Revolutionary leaders are especially significant. Using case studies including Iraq, Iran, Libya, Saudi Arabia and Venezuela, this book offers new insight into why oil politics has a central role in global peace and conflict. | ||
650 | 0 | _aPetroleum industry and trade | |
776 | 0 | 8 |
_iPrint version: _z9781107029675 |
856 | 4 | 0 | _uhttp://dx.doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781139342476 |
942 |
_2Dewey Decimal Classification _ceBooks |
||
999 |
_c37515 _d37515 |