000 02216nam a22003257a 4500
001 sulb-eb0015724
003 BD-SySUS
005 20160405134442.0
008 130118s2013||||enk o ||1 0|eng|d
020 _a9781107323780 (ebook)
020 _z9781107042148 (hardback)
020 _z9781316609330 (paperback)
040 _aUkCbUP
_beng
_erda
_cUkCbUP
050 0 0 _aDK510.763
_b.S498 2013
082 0 0 _a947.086
_223
100 1 _aShlapentokh, Vladimir,
_eauthor.
245 1 0 _aFreedom, Repression, and Private Property in Russia /
_cVladimir Shlapentokh, Anna Arutunyan.
246 3 _aFreedom, Repression, & Private Property in Russia
264 1 _aCambridge :
_bCambridge University Press,
_c2013.
300 _a1 online resource (218 pages) :
_bdigital, PDF file(s).
336 _atext
_btxt
_2rdacontent
337 _acomputer
_bc
_2rdamedia
338 _aonline resource
_bcr
_2rdacarrier
500 _aTitle from publisher's bibliographic system (viewed on 04 Apr 2016).
520 _aThis study demonstrates how the emergence of private property and a market economy after the Soviet Union's collapse enabled a degree of freedom while simultaneously supporting authoritarianism. Based on case studies, Vladimir Shlapentokh and Anna Arutunyan analyze how private property and free markets spawn feudal elements in society. These elements are so strong in post-Communist Russia that they prevent the formation of a true democratic society, while making it impossible to return to totalitarianism. The authors describe the resulting Russian society as having three types of social organization: authoritarian, feudal and liberal. The authors examine the adaptation of Soviet-era institutions like security forces, the police and the army to free market conditions and how they generated corruption; the belief that the KGB was relatively free from corruption; how large property holdings merge with power and necessitate repression; and how property relations affect government management and suppression.
700 1 _aArutunyan, Anna,
_eauthor.
776 0 8 _iPrint version:
_z9781107042148
856 4 0 _uhttp://dx.doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781107323780
942 _2Dewey Decimal Classification
_ceBooks
999 _c37568
_d37568