000			02076nam a22003137a 4500
001			sulb-eb0015884
003			BD-SySUS
005			20160405134448.0
008			120410s2013||||enk o ||1 0|eng|d
020			_a9781139382762 (ebook)
020			_z9781107031739 (hardback)
020			_z9781107649958 (paperback)
040			_aUkCbUP _beng _erda _cUkCbUP
050	0	0	_aJF1051 _b.E47 2013
082	0	0	_a302.3 _223
100	1		_aElster, Jon, _eauthor.
245	1	0	_aSecurities against Misrule : _bJuries, Assemblies, Elections / _cJon Elster.
264		1	_aCambridge : _bCambridge University Press, _c2013.
300			_a1 online resource (338 pages) : _bdigital, PDF file(s).
336			_atext _btxt _2rdacontent
337			_acomputer _bc _2rdamedia
338			_aonline resource _bcr _2rdacarrier
500			_aTitle from publisher's bibliographic system (viewed on 04 Apr 2016).
520			_aElster proposes a normative theory of collective decision making, inspired by Jeremy Bentham but not including his utilitarian philosophy. The central proposal is that in designing democratic institutions one should reduce as much as possible the impact of self-interest, passion, prejudice and bias on the decision makers, and then let the chips fall where they may. There is no independently defined good outcome that institutions can track, nor is there any way of reliably selecting good decision makers. In addition to a long initial chapter that surveys theories of collective decision making, notably social choice theory, and a chapter expounding and discussing Bentham's views, historical chapters on the jury, constituent assemblies and electoral systems develop and illustrate the main ideas. This work draws on a welter of case studies and historical episodes, from Thucydides and Plutarch to the present. It is also grounded in psychology, behavioral economics and law.
650		0	_aGroup decision making
776	0	8	_iPrint version: _z9781107031739
856	4	0	_uhttp://dx.doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781139382762
942			_2Dewey Decimal Classification _ceBooks
999			_c37728 _d37728