000			02197nam a22003137a 4500
001			sulb-eb0016421
003			BD-SySUS
005			20160405140609.0
008			111216s2012||||enk o ||1 0|eng|d
020			_a9781139225694 (ebook)
020			_z9781107027244 (hardback)
020			_z9781107658196 (paperback)
040			_aUkCbUP _beng _erda _cUkCbUP _dBD-SySUS.
050	0	0	_aJZ5588 _b.B46 2012
082	0	0	_a355/.031 _223
100	1		_aBenson, Brett V., _eauthor.
245	1	0	_aConstructing International Security : _bAlliances, Deterrence, and Moral Hazard / _cBrett V. Benson.
264		1	_aCambridge : _bCambridge University Press, _c2012.
300			_a1 online resource (216 pages) : _bdigital, PDF file(s).
336			_atext _btxt _2rdacontent
337			_acomputer _bc _2rdamedia
338			_aonline resource _bcr _2rdacarrier
500			_aTitle from publisher's bibliographic system (viewed on 04 Apr 2016).
520			_aConstructing International Security helps policy makers and students recognize effective third-party strategies for balancing deterrence and restraint in security relationships. Brett V. Benson shows that there are systematic differences among types of security commitments. Understanding these commitments is key, because commitments, such as formal military alliances and extended deterrence threats, form the basis of international security order. Benson argues that sometimes the optimal commitment conditions military assistance on specific hostile actions the adversary might take. At other times, he finds, it is best to be ambiguous by leaving an ally and adversary uncertain about whether the third party will intervene. Such uncertainty transfers risk to the ally, thereby reducing the ally's motivation to behave too aggressively. The choice of security commitment depends on how well defenders can observe hostilities leading to war and on their evaluations of dispute settlements, their ally's security and the relative strength of the defender.
650		0	_aSecurity, International
776	0	8	_iPrint version: _z9781107027244
856	4	0	_uhttp://dx.doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781139225694
942			_2Dewey Decimal Classification _ceBooks
999			_c37859 _d37859