000			02159nam a22003257a 4500
001			sulb-eb0016889
003			BD-SySUS
005			20160405140625.0
008			101006s2011||||enk o ||1 0|eng|d
020			_a9780511973031 (ebook)
020			_z9781107096424 (hardback)
040			_aUkCbUP _beng _erda _cUkCbUP _dBD-SySUS.
050	0	0	_aQA76.9.M35 _bT36 2012
082	0	0	_a005.8 _223
100	1		_aTambe, Milind, _eauthor.
245	1	0	_aSecurity and Game Theory : _bAlgorithms, Deployed Systems, Lessons Learned / _cMilind Tambe.
246	3		_aSecurity & Game Theory
264		1	_aCambridge : _bCambridge University Press, _c2011.
300			_a1 online resource (336 pages) : _bdigital, PDF file(s).
336			_atext _btxt _2rdacontent
337			_acomputer _bc _2rdamedia
338			_aonline resource _bcr _2rdacarrier
500			_aTitle from publisher's bibliographic system (viewed on 04 Apr 2016).
520			_aGlobal threats of terrorism, drug-smuggling and other crimes have led to a significant increase in research on game theory for security. Game theory provides a sound mathematical approach to deploy limited security resources to maximize their effectiveness. A typical approach is to randomize security schedules to avoid predictability, with the randomization using artificial intelligence techniques to take into account the importance of different targets and potential adversary reactions. This book distills the forefront of this research to provide the first and only study of long-term deployed applications of game theory for security for key organizations such as the Los Angeles International Airport police and the US Federal Air Marshals Service. The author and his research group draw from their extensive experience working with security officials to intelligently allocate limited security resources to protect targets, outlining the applications of these algorithms in research and the real world.
650		0	_aComputer security
650		0	_aGame theory
776	0	8	_iPrint version: _z9781107096424
856	4	0	_uhttp://dx.doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511973031
942			_2Dewey Decimal Classification _ceBooks
999			_c38327 _d38327