000			02070nam a22003017a 4500
001			sulb-eb0017115
003			BD-SySUS
005			20160405140633.0
008			110302s2011||||enk o ||1 0|eng|d
020			_a9781139044226 (ebook)
020			_z9781107014725 (hardback)
020			_z9781107676589 (paperback)
040			_aUkCbUP _beng _erda _cUkCbUP _dBD-SySUS.
050	0	0	_aDS79.757 _b.H37 2012
082	0	0	_a956.7044/31 _223
100	1		_aHarvey, Frank P., _eauthor.
245	1	0	_aExplaining the Iraq War : _bCounterfactual Theory, Logic and Evidence / _cFrank P. Harvey.
264		1	_aCambridge : _bCambridge University Press, _c2011.
300			_a1 online resource (360 pages) : _bdigital, PDF file(s).
336			_atext _btxt _2rdacontent
337			_acomputer _bc _2rdamedia
338			_aonline resource _bcr _2rdacarrier
500			_aTitle from publisher's bibliographic system (viewed on 04 Apr 2016).
520			_aThe almost universally accepted explanation for the Iraq War is very clear and consistent - the US decision to attack Saddam Hussein's regime on March 19, 2003 was a product of the ideological agenda, misguided priorities, intentional deceptions and grand strategies of President George W. Bush and prominent 'neoconservatives' and 'unilateralists' on his national security team. Despite the widespread appeal of this version of history, Frank P. Harvey argues that it remains an unsubstantiated assertion and an underdeveloped argument without a logical foundation. His book aims to provide a historically grounded account of the events and strategies which pushed the US-UK coalition towards war. The analysis is based on both factual and counterfactual evidence, combines causal mechanisms derived from multiple levels of analysis and ultimately confirms the role of path dependence and momentum as a much stronger explanation for the sequence of decisions that led to war.
776	0	8	_iPrint version: _z9781107014725
856	4	0	_uhttp://dx.doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781139044226
942			_2Dewey Decimal Classification _ceBooks
999			_c38553 _d38553