000			02294nam a22003257a 4500
001			sulb-eb0017171
003			BD-SySUS
005			20160405140636.0
008			110718s2012||||enk o ||1 0|eng|d
020			_a9781139108553 (ebook)
020			_z9781107021112 (hardback)
020			_z9781107605435 (paperback)
040			_aUkCbUP _beng _erda _cUkCbUP _dBD-SySUS.
050	0	0	_aJQ1879.A5 _bA77 2012
082	0	0	_a324.70967 _223
100	1		_aArriola, Leonardo R., _eauthor.
245	1	0	_aMulti-Ethnic Coalitions in Africa : _bBusiness Financing of Opposition Election Campaigns / _cLeonardo R. Arriola.
264		1	_aCambridge : _bCambridge University Press, _c2012.
300			_a1 online resource (324 pages) : _bdigital, PDF file(s).
336			_atext _btxt _2rdacontent
337			_acomputer _bc _2rdamedia
338			_aonline resource _bcr _2rdacarrier
490	0		_aCambridge Studies in Comparative Politics
500			_aTitle from publisher's bibliographic system (viewed on 04 Apr 2016).
520			_aWhy are politicians able to form electoral coalitions that bridge ethnic divisions in some countries and not others? This book answers this question by presenting a theory of pecuniary coalition building in multi-ethnic countries governed through patronage. Focusing on sub-Saharan Africa, the book explains how the relative autonomy of business from state-controlled capital affects political bargaining among opposition politicians in particular. While incumbents form coalitions by using state resources to secure cross-ethnic endorsements, opposition politicians must rely on the private resources of business to do the same. This book combines cross-national analyses of African countries with in-depth case studies of Cameroon and Kenya to show that incumbents actively manipulate financial controls to prevent business from supporting their opposition. It demonstrates that opposition politicians are more likely to coalesce across ethnic cleavages once incumbents have lost their ability to blackmail the business sector through financial reprisals.
776	0	8	_iPrint version: _z9781107021112
830		0	_aCambridge Studies in Comparative Politics.
856	4	0	_uhttp://dx.doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781139108553
942			_2Dewey Decimal Classification _ceBooks
999			_c38609 _d38609