000 01286nam a22002657a 4500
001 sulb-eb0019663
003 BD-SySUS
005 20160405161620.0
008 091203s2008 enk fo 001|0|eng d
020 _a9780199866922 (ebook) :
_cNo price
040 _aStDuBDS
_beng
_cStDuBDS
_dBD-SySUS
_epn
050 4 _aBD450
082 0 4 _a126
_222
100 1 _aFeit, Neil.
245 1 0 _aBelief about the self
_h[electronic resource] :
_ba defense of the property theory of content /
_cNeil Feit.
260 _aOxford :
_bOxford University Press,
_cc2008.
300 _a1 online resource (xvi, 195 p.)
520 8 _aPhilosophers typically suppose that the contents of our beliefs and other cognitive attitudes are propositions - things that might be true or false, and their truth values do not vary from time to time, place to place, or person to person. Neil Feit argues that this view breaks down in the face of beliefs about the self.
588 _aDescription based on print version record.
504 _aIncludes bibliographical references and index.
650 0 _aSelf (Philosophy)
776 0 8 _iPrint version
_z9780195341362
856 4 0 _3Oxford scholarship online
_uhttp://dx.doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195341362.001.0001
942 _2Dewey Decimal Classification
_ceBooks
999 _c41128
_d41128