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020 _a9781461463191
_9978-1-4614-6319-1
024 7 _a10.1007/978-1-4614-6319-1
_2doi
050 4 _aTK1-9971
072 7 _aTJK
_2bicssc
072 7 _aTEC041000
_2bisacsh
082 0 4 _a621.382
_223
100 1 _aKakhbod, Ali.
_eauthor.
245 1 0 _aResource Allocation in Decentralized Systems with Strategic Agents
_h[electronic resource] :
_bAn Implementation Theory Approach /
_cby Ali Kakhbod.
264 1 _aNew York, NY :
_bSpringer New York :
_bImprint: Springer,
_c2013.
300 _aXVII, 88 p.
_bonline resource.
336 _atext
_btxt
_2rdacontent
337 _acomputer
_bc
_2rdamedia
338 _aonline resource
_bcr
_2rdacarrier
347 _atext file
_bPDF
_2rda
490 1 _aSpringer Theses, Recognizing Outstanding Ph.D. Research,
_x2190-5053
505 0 _aI Introduction -- II Implementation Theory -- III Unicast Service Provisioning -- IV Power Allocation and Spectrum Sharing in Multi-user, Multi- channel Systems -- V Multi-rate Multicast Service Provisioning -- VI Summary and Future Directions -- Appendices.
520 _aThis thesis presents a significant contribution to decentralized resource allocation problems with strategic agents. The study focused on three classes of problems arising in communication networks. (C1). Unicast service provisioning in wired networks. (C2). Multi-rate multicast service provisioning in wired networks. (C3). Power allocation and spectrum sharing in multi-user multi-channel wireless communication systems.  Problems in (C1) are market problems; problems in (C2) are a combination of markets and public goods; problems in (C3) are public goods. Dr. Kakhbod developed game forms/mechanisms for unicast and multi-rate multicast service provisioning that possess specific properties. First, the allocations corresponding to all Nash equilibria (NE) of the games induced by the mechanisms are optimal solutions of the corresponding centralized allocation problems, where the objective is the maximization of the sum of the agents'  utilities.  Second, the strategic agents voluntarily participate in the allocation process.  Third, the budget is balanced at the allocations corresponding to all NE of the game induced by the mechanism as well as at all other feasible allocations. For the power allocation and spectrum sharing problem, he developed a game form that possesses the second and third properties as detailed above along with a fourth property: the allocations corresponding to all NE of the game induced by the mechanism are Pareto optimal. The thesis contributes to the state of the art of mechanism design theory. In particular, designing efficient mechanisms for the class of problems that are a combination of markets and public goods, for the first time, have been addressed in this thesis.  The exposition, although highly rigorous and technical, is elegant and insightful which makes this thesis work easily accessible to those just entering this field and will also be much appreciated by experts in the field.
650 0 _aEngineering.
650 0 _aComputer organization.
650 0 _aElectrical engineering.
650 0 _aLaw and economics.
650 1 4 _aEngineering.
650 2 4 _aCommunications Engineering, Networks.
650 2 4 _aComputer Systems Organization and Communication Networks.
650 2 4 _aLaw and Economics.
710 2 _aSpringerLink (Online service)
773 0 _tSpringer eBooks
776 0 8 _iPrinted edition:
_z9781461463184
830 0 _aSpringer Theses, Recognizing Outstanding Ph.D. Research,
_x2190-5053
856 4 0 _uhttp://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4614-6319-1
912 _aZDB-2-ENG
942 _2Dewey Decimal Classification
_ceBooks
999 _c44603
_d44603