000 03536nam a22005777a 4500
001 sulb-eb0025701
003 BD-SySUS
005 20160413122540.0
007 cr nn 008mamaa
008 131209s2013 gw | s |||| 0|eng d
020 _a9783642450464
_9978-3-642-45046-4
024 7 _a10.1007/978-3-642-45046-4
_2doi
050 4 _aQA75.5-76.95
072 7 _aUNH
_2bicssc
072 7 _aUND
_2bicssc
072 7 _aCOM030000
_2bisacsh
082 0 4 _a025.04
_223
245 1 0 _aWeb and Internet Economics
_h[electronic resource] :
_b9th International Conference, WINE 2013, Cambridge, MA, USA, December 11-14, 2013, Proceedings /
_cedited by Yiling Chen, Nicole Immorlica.
264 1 _aBerlin, Heidelberg :
_bSpringer Berlin Heidelberg :
_bImprint: Springer,
_c2013.
300 _aXIV, 440 p. 25 illus.
_bonline resource.
336 _atext
_btxt
_2rdacontent
337 _acomputer
_bc
_2rdamedia
338 _aonline resource
_bcr
_2rdacarrier
347 _atext file
_bPDF
_2rda
490 1 _aLecture Notes in Computer Science,
_x0302-9743 ;
_v8289
505 0 _aThe Asymmetric Matrix Partition Problem -- Polylogarithmic Supports are required for Approximate Well-Supported Nash Equilibria -- The Computational Complexity of Random Serial Dictatorship -- Incentives and Efficiency in Uncertain Collaborative Environments -- Revenue Maximization with Nonexcludable Goods -- On Lookahead Equilibria in Congestion Games -- Trading Agent Kills Market Information: Evidence from Online Social Lending -- Designing Markets for Daily Deals -- The Exact Computational Complexity of Evolutionarily Stable Strategies -- The Price of Anarchy of the Proportional Allocation Mechanism Revisited -- Valuation Compressions in VCG-Based Combinatorial Auctions -- Limits of Efficiency in Sequential Auctions -- Competition in the Presence of Social Networks: How Many Service Providers Maximize Welfare? -- Resolving Braess's Paradox in Random Networks -- A protocol for cutting matroids like cakes -- Quantitative Comparative Statics for a Multimarket Paradox -- Price of Anarchy for the N-player Competitive Cascade Game with Submodular Activation Functions.
520 _aThis book constitutes the thoroughly refereed conference proceedings of the 9th International Conference on Web and Internet Economics, WINE 2013, held in Cambridge, MA, USA, in December 2013. The 36 revised full papers were carefully reviewed and selected from 150 submissions and cover research in theoretical computer science, artificial intelligence, and microeconomics.
650 0 _aComputer science.
650 0 _aComputer communication systems.
650 0 _aAlgorithms.
650 0 _aComputer science
_xMathematics.
650 0 _aInformation storage and retrieval.
650 0 _aE-commerce.
650 1 4 _aComputer Science.
650 2 4 _aInformation Storage and Retrieval.
650 2 4 _ae-Commerce/e-business.
650 2 4 _aComputer Communication Networks.
650 2 4 _aAlgorithm Analysis and Problem Complexity.
650 2 4 _aMathematics of Computing.
700 1 _aChen, Yiling.
_eeditor.
700 1 _aImmorlica, Nicole.
_eeditor.
710 2 _aSpringerLink (Online service)
773 0 _tSpringer eBooks
776 0 8 _iPrinted edition:
_z9783642450457
830 0 _aLecture Notes in Computer Science,
_x0302-9743 ;
_v8289
856 4 0 _uhttp://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-45046-4
912 _aZDB-2-SCS
912 _aZDB-2-LNC
942 _2Dewey Decimal Classification
_ceBooks
999 _c47793
_d47793